

# **Online Tracking and Security - report of assignment 2**

Group A2 12

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Task 1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Task 2</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Task 3</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Task 4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Task 5</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Task 6</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Task 7</b>	<b>11</b>
7.1	Crawl-Accept	11
7.2	Crawl-Block	12
7.3	Crawl-Reject	12
<b>8</b>	<b>Task 8</b>	<b>13</b>
8.1	Crawl-Accept	13
8.2	Crawl-Block	14
8.3	Crawl-Reject	15
<b>9</b>	<b>Task 9</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Task 10</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Task 11</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>Task 12</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>Task 13</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>Task 14</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>15</b>	<b>Task 15</b>	<b>22</b>
15.1	What were the most challenging parts of the assignment?	22
15.2	What were the findings that surprised you, if any?	22

# 1 Task 1




Figure 1: (1a) Distribution of Requests per Website by Crawl Type

(1b) Distribution of Third-party Requests per Website by Crawl Type




Figure 2: (1b) Distribution of Third-party Requests per Website by Crawl Type

(1c) Distribution of Distinct Third-party Domains per Website by Crawl Type




Figure 3: (1c) Distribution of Distinct Third-party Domains per Website by Crawl Type




Figure 4: (1d) Distribution of Distinct Entities per Website by Crawl Type

## 2 Task 2

	Crawl-Accept			Crawl-Block			Crawl-Reject		
Metric	min	median	max	min	median	max	min	median	max
Number of requests per website	10	576.5	1897	10	251.0	1845	10	229.0	1114
Number of third-party requests per website	8	444.0	1870	8	122.0	1282	8	117.5	728
Number of distinct third party domains	2	41.5	139	2	15.0	56	1	18.5	64
Number of distinct entities	1	20.5	89	1	7.0	31	0	8.0	37

Figure 5: Metrics and statistics comparison across different crawl types

Metric	Crawl-Accept			Crawl-Block			Crawl-Reject		
	min	median	max	min	median	max	min	median	max
Number of requests per website	10	576.5	1897	10	251.0	1845	10	229.0	1114
Number of third-party requests per website	8	444.0	1870	8	122.0	1282	8	117.5	728
Number of distinct third party domains	2	41.5	139	2	15.0	56	1	18.5	64
Number of distinct entities	1	20.5	89	1	7.0	31	0	8.0	37

Metrics and statistics comparison across different crawl types

### 3 Task 3




Figure 6: Number of websites with different advertising by different crawl types

Crawl Comparison (3b)




Figure 7: Number of websites with different analytics by different crawl types

## 4 Task 4

Metric	European News Sites			US News Sites		
	min	median	max	min	median	max
<b>Number of requests per website</b>	93	798.0	1897	10	469.0	1530
<b>Number of third-party requests per website</b>	12	636.5	1870	8	311.5	1429
<b>Number of distinct third party domains</b>	3	66.5	137	2	32.0	139
<b>Number of distinct entities</b>	1	24.5	89	1	16.5	89

Figure 8: Metrics and statistics comparison across different crawl types

## 5 Task 5




Figure 9: Number of websites with different advertising by different location

Location comparison (5b) - Crawl-Accept




Figure 10: Number of websites with different analytics by different location

## 6 Task 6

METHOD: Process entries chronologically. For each domain, track which cookies were set via Set-Cookie. If a cookie appears in a request but was never set by Set-Cookie for that specific earlier, it's likely JS-set.

1. Track all cookies set via Set-Cookie response headers (server-side)
2. Track all cookies sent in Cookie request headers (requests to server)
3. Cookies appearing in requests but NEVER in Set-Cookie are JS-set

RATIONALE:

1. Server-side cookies appear in Set-Cookie response headers
2. JS-set cookies (`document.cookie=...`) only appear in Cookie request headers
3. By tracking server-set cookies per domain, we identify client-side cookies

In total 2533 potential JavaScript-set cookies were found. Full result set is attached as 'task6\_js\_cookies.csv', below there is a table of 5 potentially JS-set cookies for ad.nl website with cookie domain:

	cookie_name	website	cookie_domain
0	_sp_ses.e23f	ad.nl	dpgmedia.nl
1	_sp_id.e23f	ad.nl	dpgmedia.nl
2	gtm Temptation_template_id	ad.nl	ad.nl
3	tcf20_purposes	ad.nl	ad.nl
4	_vwo_uuid_v2	ad.nl	ad.nl

Figure 11: Table of 5 potentially JS-set cookies for ad.nl website with cookie domain

## 7 Task 7

Below there are three tables (one table for each crawl type) of the ten most prevalent third-party domains (based on the number of distinct websites where the third-party domain is present). The Disconnect Categories column contain categories of the domain in Disconnect's blocklist (or NA, if absent).

### 7.1 Crawl-Accept

	Third-party domain	Number of distinct websites	Disconnect categories
0	googlesyndication.com	29	NA
1	google.com	28	Advertising, Analytics, Fingerprinting, General, Social
2	doubleclick.net	28	NA
3	amazon-adsystem.com	27	NA
4	googleapis.com	25	NA
5	adtrafficquality.google	25	NA
6	criteo.com	25	Advertising
7	googletagmanager.com	23	NA
8	adsrvr.org	22	NA
9	bidswitch.net	22	NA

Figure 12: Ten most prevalent third-party domains for Crawl-Accept

## 7.2 Crawl-Block

	Third-party domain	Number of distinct websites	Disconnect categories
0	googletagmanager.com	22	NA
1	google.com	21	Advertising, Analytics, Fingerprinting, General, Social
2	doubleclick.net	19	NA
3	googleapis.com	18	NA
4	googlesyndication.com	15	NA
5	amazon-adsystem.com	14	NA
6	gstatic.com	12	NA
7	scorecardresearch.com	11	NA
8	jsdelivr.net	9	NA
9	cookielaw.org	9	NA

Figure 13: Ten most prevalent third-party domains for Crawl-Block

## 7.3 Crawl-Reject

	Third-party domain	Number of distinct websites	Disconnect categories
0	googletagmanager.com	23	NA
1	doubleclick.net	22	NA
2	googlesyndication.com	20	NA
3	googleapis.com	20	NA
4	google.com	18	Advertising, Analytics, Fingerprinting, General, Social
5	gstatic.com	15	NA
6	amazon-adsystem.com	14	NA
7	scorecardresearch.com	11	NA
8	google-analytics.com	11	NA
9	adtrafficquality.google	10	NA

Figure 14: Ten most prevalent third-party domains for Crawl-Reject

## 8 Task 8

Below there are three tables (one table for each crawl type) of the top ten websites that send requests to the highest number of distinct third-party domains.

### 8.1 Crawl-Accept

	<b>Website</b>	<b>Country code</b>	<b>Number of distinct third-party domains</b>
<b>0</b>	apnews.com	us	139
<b>1</b>	libero.it	it	137
<b>2</b>	gazzetta.it	it	133
<b>3</b>	the-sun.com	uk	129
<b>4</b>	corriere.it	it	128
<b>5</b>	nypost.com	us	126
<b>6</b>	newsweek.com	us	119
<b>7</b>	dailymail.co.uk	uk	107
<b>8</b>	telegraaf.nl	nl	106
<b>9</b>	huffpost.com	us	95

Figure 15: Top ten websites that send requests to the highest number of distinct third-party domains for Crawl-Accept

## 8.2 Crawl-Block

	Website	Country code	Number of distinct third-party domains
0	nbcnews.com	us	56
1	newsweek.com	us	50
2	apnews.com	us	46
3	ad.nl	nl	36
4	nypost.com	us	35
5	gazzetta.it	it	35
6	telegraaf.nl	nl	26
7	businessinsider.com	us	25
8	the-sun.com	uk	25
9	repubblica.it	it	24

Figure 16: Top ten websites that send requests to the highest number of distinct third-party domains for Crawl-Block

### 8.3 Crawl-Reject

	Website	Country code	Number of distinct third-party domains
0	nbcnews.com	us	64
1	newsweek.com	us	52
2	apnews.com	us	51
3	businessinsider.com	us	40
4	nypost.com	us	35
5	gazzetta.it	it	34
6	bbc.co.uk	uk	28
7	corriere.it	it	27
8	cnbc.com	us	26
9	telegraaf.nl	nl	26

Figure 17: Top ten websites that send requests to the highest number of distinct third-party domains for Crawl-Reject

## 9 Task 9

The objective of this task is to identify the 10 visits that generated the highest number of distinct server IP addresses.

	Website	Crawl type	Country code	Number of distinct server IPs
0	ad.nl	Accept	nl	0
1	apnews.com	Accept	us	0
2	axios.com	Accept	us	0
3	bbc.co.uk	Accept	uk	0
4	bloomberg.com	Accept	us	0
5	businessinsider.com	Accept	us	0
6	buzzfeed.com	Accept	us	0
7	cbsnews.com	Accept	us	0
8	cnbc.com	Accept	us	0
9	cnn.com	Accept	us	0

Figure 18: Top 10 visits by number of distinct server IPs

### Analysis:

The analysis is unable to determine the number of distinct IP addresses because the corresponding information (the `serverIPAddress` field of the HAR entries) does not appear to have been recorded correctly by the crawler (Playwright) during data acquisition. This field was consistently null or missing, preventing any valid count.

## 10 Task 10

This analysis focuses on `Permissions-Policy` headers (formerly `Feature-Policy`) that control access to sensitive browser features. The goal was to identify the five permissions most frequently **completely disabled**.

Permission	Crawl-Accept	Crawl-Reject	Crawl-Block
<b>geolocation</b>	geolocation: 15	geolocation: 8	geolocation: 8
<b>microphone</b>	microphone: 15	microphone: 8	microphone: 8
<b>camera</b>	camera: 15	camera: 8	camera: 8
<b>midi</b>	midi: 14	midi: 8	midi: 8
<b>interest-cohort</b>	interest-cohort: 13	interest-cohort: 8	interest-cohort: 8

Figure 19: Number of distinct sites that have completely disabled sensitive permissions per crawl mode.

#### Analysis:

1. **Hardware Privacy:** Permissions related to user hardware (geolocation, microphone, camera) lead the ranking, being disabled on **15 sites** in Crawl-Accept mode. This signals a strong intention on the part of first-party sites to **prevent the abuse of these sensitive resources** by third-party scripts.
2. **Rejection of New Tracking:** The frequent disabling of the **interest-cohort** permission (13 sites) reflects a **widespread rejection** by sites of Google's new advertising tracking API.
3. **Impact of Crawl Mode:** Deactivation is observed less often in Crawl-Reject and Crawl-Block modes (8 sites).

## 11 Task 11

The objective of this task is to determine how many websites explicitly define a **referrer policy** to control the amount of URL information transmitted to third parties.

	Crawl-Accept	Crawl-Reject	Crawl-Block
0	strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 22	strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 16	strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 21
1	same-origin: 9	same-origin: 6	same-origin: 5
2	no-referrer: 8	no-referrer: 4	no-referrer: 4
3	unsafe-url: 3	unsafe-url: 3	unsafe-url: 3
4	origin: 2	strict-origin: 1	strict-origin: 1
5	strict-origin: 1	origin-when-cross-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 1	origin-when-cross-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 1
6	origin-when-cross-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin: 1		

Figure 20: Distribution of observed reference policies by crawl mode.

### Analysis

- 1. Dominance of Security Policies:** The most frequently observed policy is **strict-origin-when-cross-origin** (22 observations in Accept mode). This is the recommended default policy: it enhances privacy while maintaining some functionality.
- 2. Persistent Risky Policy:** The **unsafe-url** policy is observed on 3 sites in all crawl modes. This policy is considered the most risky because it transmits the full URL, potentially exposing sensitive information to third parties.
- 3. Impact of Restrictive Modes:** The **Crawl-Reject** (30 observations) and **Crawl-Block** (34 observations) modes show a lower total number of observations than the **Crawl-Accept** mode (46 observations). The reduction observed is due to the **blocking of third-party requests** in these modes.

## 12 Task 12

The objective of this task is to analyze the use of the `Accept-CH` header by websites, which allows them to request detailed information (Client Hints) about the user's device and software from the browser. This information, can be used for fingerprinting (unique user identification).

	<b>Crawl-Accept</b>	<b>Crawl-Reject</b>	<b>Crawl-Block</b>
<b>0</b>	Sec-CH-UA-Model: 28	Sec-CH-UA-Model: 20	Sec-CH-UA-Model: 13
<b>1</b>	Sec-CH-UA-Arch: 28	Sec-CH-UA-Arch: 20	Sec-CH-UA-Arch: 13
<b>2</b>	Sec-CH-UA-Full-Version-List: 27	Sec-CH-UA-Full-Version-List: 19	Sec-CH-UA-Full-Version-List: 12

Figure 21: Frequency of observed Client Hints requests

- 1. Dominant Fingerprinting Information:** The three most requested hints aim to collect technical information about the device and browser: the **Device Model** (`Sec-CH-UA-Model`), the **CPU architecture** (`Sec-CH-UA-Arch`), and the **full list of versions** of the browser (`Sec-CH-UA-Full-Version-List`). This combined information is useful for **fingerprinting** and user identification.
- 2. Dependence on Acceptance:** These hints are most frequently requested in **Crawl-Accept** mode. Sites clearly use this technique when they have obtained consent for tracking.
- 3. Impact of Restrictive Modes:** The **Crawl-Reject** and **Crawl-Block** modes show a significant reduction in the number of sites requesting these hints.
  - The reduction in **Crawl-Reject** mode indicates that the consent management script, when refused, **removes the request** for Client Hints.
  - The reduction in **Crawl-Block** mode is even more pronounced. Blocking third-party resources prevents the loading of advertising and analytics scripts that are often responsible for issuing `Accept-CH` headers.

## 13 Task 13

The purpose of this analysis is to detect redirects between domains belonging to different entities.

Cross-entity redirects – Crawl-Accept

	<b>Source domain</b>	<b>Source entity</b>	<b>Target domain</b>	<b>Target entity</b>	<b>Website</b>
<b>0</b>	1rx.io	Nexxen	adsrvr.org	The Trade Desk	apnews.com
<b>1</b>	1rx.io	Nexxen	adsrvr.org	The Trade Desk	apnews.com
<b>2</b>	1rx.io	Nexxen	adsrvr.org	The Trade Desk	libero.it
<b>3</b>	1rx.io	Nexxen	adsrvr.org	The Trade Desk	nbcnews.com
<b>4</b>	1rx.io	Nexxen	adsrvr.org	The Trade Desk	newsweek.com
...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>1034</b>	zemanta.com	Outbrain	rubiconproject.com	Magnite	gazzetta.it
<b>1035</b>	zemanta.com	Outbrain	rubiconproject.com	Magnite	the-sun.com
<b>1036</b>	zemanta.com	Outbrain	seedtag.com	SeedTag	corriere.it
<b>1037</b>	zemanta.com	Outbrain	seedtag.com	SeedTag	telegraaf.nl
<b>1038</b>	zemanta.com	Outbrain	smartadserver.com	Equativ	libero.it

Figure 22: Redirection in accept mode

#### Cross-entity redirects – Crawl-Reject

	Source domain	Source entity	Target domain	Target entity	Website
0	admanmedia.com	AdmanMedia	criteo.com	Criteo	nbcnews.com
1	casalemedia.com	IndexExchange	doubleclick.net	Google	nbcnews.com
2	doubleclick.net	Google	criteo.com	Criteo	nbcnews.com
3	doubleclick.net	Google	demdex.net	Adobe	nbcnews.com
4	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
5	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
6	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
7	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
8	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
9	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
10	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk
11	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	bbc.co.uk

Figure 23: Sample of redirects in reject mode (30 in total)

#### Cross-entity redirects – Crawl-Block

	Source domain	Source entity	Target domain	Target entity	Website
0	doubleclick.net	Google	adnxs.com	Microsoft	ad.nl
1	doubleclick.net	Google	demdex.net	Adobe	nbcnews.com
2	doubleclick.net	Google	doubleverify.com	DoubleVerify	ad.nl
3	yahoo.com	Yahoo!	360yield.com	Improve Digital	libero.it

Figure 24: Redirection in block mode

#### Analysis:

There is a **drastic drop** in the number of inter-entity redirects between acceptance mode and restrictive modes.

- In Crawl-Acceptance mode, a very high number of redirects (approximately **1038**) occur, confirming that this technique is used extensively when consent is given.
- In **Crawl-Reject** mode, and especially in **Crawl-Block** mode, the number of redirects drops to marginal levels (**30** and **3**), demonstrating that consent management and blocking mechanisms effectively target and disable most advertising redirect chains.

## 14 Task 14

This task analyzes the phenomenon of **CNAME Cloaking** (*CNAME masking*).

First-party subdomain	CNAME record	CNAME entity	Disconnect categories
0 <a href="https://nessinsider.com">nessinsider.com</a>	atcv1h5rg5p.customer.permutive.app	Permutive	Advertising
1 <a href="https://plates.cnb.com">plates.cnb.com</a>	d3qj5wuhimh3ra.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
2 <a href="https://metrics.cnn.com">metrics.cnn.com</a>	cnn.com.102.122.207.net	Adobe	Advertising, Email, FingerprintingGeneral
3 <a href="https://orriere.corriere.it">orriere.corriere.it</a>	d3mixdy9px9a4c.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
4 <a href="https://video.corriere.it">video.corriere.it</a>	d1p15w45f27aqk.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
5 <a href="https://video.corriere.it">video.corriere.it</a>	d24p96brdjmjd.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
6 <a href="https://ew.foxnews.com">ew.foxnews.com</a>	247preview.foxnews.com.akamaized.net	Take-Two	Analytics, FingerprintingGeneral, FingerprintingInvasive
7 <a href="https://ics.foxnews.com">ics.foxnews.com</a>	foxnews.com.ssl.d1.sc.omtrdc.net	Adobe	Advertising, Email, FingerprintingGeneral
8 <a href="https://vice2.gazzetta.it">vice2.gazzetta.it</a>	d2arvzuswg4o6w.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
9 <a href="https://2-mtc.gazzetta.it">2-mtc.gazzetta.it</a>	d1fm7fuuiekry8j.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
10 <a href="https://menti.gazzetta.it">menti.gazzetta.it</a>	d23yhnnqssijqq.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
11 <a href="https://video.gazzetta.it">video.gazzetta.it</a>	d9kavqumogq80.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
12 <a href="https://wst.lefigaro.fr">wst.lefigaro.fr</a>	www.wysistat.com	Wysistat	Analytics
13 <a href="https://www.libero.it">www.libero.it</a>	d31d9gezsy1z8.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
14 <a href="https://www.n-tv.de">www.n-tv.de</a>	d2tsqtep9kts9c.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
15 <a href="https://metrics.n-tv.de">metrics.n-tv.de</a>	771764.eu-central-1.eks.amazonaws.com	Amazon	Content
16 <a href="https://bilder.n-tv.de">bilder.n-tv.de</a>	d2tsqtep9kts9c.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
17 <a href="https://urcepoint.n-tv.de">urcepoint.n-tv.de</a>	cdn-1239.privacy-mgmt.com	Sourcepoint	ConsentManagers
18 <a href="https://nt.nbcnews.com">nt.nbcnews.com</a>	nbcnews.com.ssl.sc.omtrdc.net	Adobe	Advertising, Email, FingerprintingGeneral
19 <a href="https://newsweek.com">newsweek.com</a>	cdn-newsweek.tinypass.com	Piano	Analytics
20 <a href="https://newsweek.com">newsweek.com</a>	auth-newsweek.tinypass.com	Piano	Analytics
21 <a href="https://newsweek.com">newsweek.com</a>	c2-newsweek.tinypass.com	Piano	Analytics
22 <a href="https://newsweek.com">newsweek.com</a>	vx-newsweek.tinypass.com	Piano	Analytics
23 <a href="https://newsweek.com">newsweek.com</a>	d2examor23101.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
24 <a href="https://pbc.nypost.com">pbc.nypost.com</a>	d126peu52a12md.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
25 <a href="https://dd.nytimes.com">dd.nytimes.com</a>	sslogen-nyt.datadome.co	Datadome	Anti-fraud
26 <a href="https://nts.repubblica.it">nts.repubblica.it</a>	d2qidjd0m1xg92.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
27 <a href="https://www.rtl.de">www.rtl.de</a>	d120w0w1honsn7.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive
28 <a href="https://ourcepoint rtl.de">ourcepoint rtl.de</a>	cdn-1239.privacy-mgmt.com	Sourcepoint	ConsentManagers
29 <a href="https://cdn.the-sun.com">cdn.the-sun.com</a>	cdn-259.privacy-mgmt.com	Sourcepoint	ConsentManagers
30 <a href="https://www.wsj.com">www.wsj.com</a>	dlp0y1mxy0v3u.cloudfront.net	dz7188oz6lnyb.cloudfront.net	Analytics, Content, FingerprintingInvasive

Figure 25: CNAME Cloaking

## 15 Task 15

### 15.1 What were the most challenging parts of the assignment?

The hardest part was automating cookie acceptance and blocking using Playwright. Every country uses different cookie consent designs—some use pop-up windows, others use banners or embedded frames. This made it difficult to write code that worked across all websites. Each region needed custom handling because there's no standard way websites ask for cookie consent

### 15.2 What were the findings that surprised you, if any?

Several things were unexpected. First, Playwright proved to be less developed than expected for handling complex cookie scenarios. The tool lacks built-in features for tracking cookie changes, requiring manual workarounds.

Second, we discovered lordofthefrogs.com listed as a data broker in the Disconnect blocklist.

Third, cookie consent varies significantly by country. Some UK and French websites force users to pay for a subscription if they want to block tracking cookies. These "pay or consent" walls charge money for ad-free browsing, which raises questions about whether consent is truly voluntary under GDPR rules.